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THE PROPOSED NORTH DAKOTA RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
CHARLES LIEBERT CRUM*

N THE preceding article there appears a plea for the adoption
of the proposed North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure' by one
of the nation's most distinguished authorities on pleading and practice. Judge Holtzoff's standing as an expert on the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure- from which the North Dakota Rules have been
largely derived- is attested by the fact he is co-author of a work
on them which is considered definitive in its field. Undoubtedly
it is a work of supererogation to publish two papers on this subject
in the same issue of the North Dakota Law Review when one of
them bears such distinguished authorship.
Nevertheless the subject involved is one of such importance and
has aroused so much professional interest that possibly two treatments of it are permissible, particularly when the method of analysis differs. This paper is an attempt to explore the background and
significance of the proposed North Dakota Rules on a rule-by-rule
basis; it is hoped that members of the profession will find it of continuing usefulness in applying the new rules when - and if - they
are adopted.
As of this writing, the largest single question involving the proposed rules centers about that word if. The rules have been submitted to the North Dakota Supreme Court but have not as yet been
finally approved. It is undoubtedly conservative to suggest that
whatever action the Court takes with respect to them will constitute its most significant decision for 1956.
When one pauses to reflect on the extent to which substantive law
bears the imprint of procedural distinctions, the true importance of
what is involved becomes evident. It is a truism to remark that
procedural law has a pervasive effect upon substantive law much
greater than is sometimes realized. Hence it sometimes happens
that the consequences of procedural change are felt in unxpected
ways.
*Associate Professor of Law, University of North Dakota.
1. The North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure will be cited hereinafter in this discussion as "'N.D.R.Civ.P." The text version of the rules used in preparing this discussion
has been derived from the pamphlet "Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure for the District
Courts of North Dakota" published by the West Publishing Company as a service to the
profession, and from the supplement amending this version filed with the' Supreme Court
of North Dakota by the Joint Committee of the Judicial Council and State Bar Association
on June 17, 1955.
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Certainly it is true that procedural provisions which have found
their way into the body of substantive law have a tendency to persist in their influence much longer than might be expected. This is
readily illustrated by the persistence of rules based on the formulary writs which served as a foundation for actions in the early days
of the common law. The technical and arbitrary classifications
based upon common law forms of action have long since been
formally erased from the statute books, and yet as recently as 1936
it was possible for Maitland to write, with obvious justification, that
"forms of action we have buried, but they still rule us from their
graves."" Presumably if the new rules are adopted, something of
the sort will also be true of the provisions of the Field Code of Civil
Procedure, our ground rules for civil actions since 1868.:' One must
understand wherein the Field Code proved deficient in order to
appreciate the reasons underlying the various provisions of the pro4
posed North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure.
The truth is that procedural law has a tendency to shape substantive rights because attorneys and judges necessarily do their thinking about questions of substance within the framework of reference
furnished by the body of law which governs the enforcement and
application of remedies. In practice the question of what remedial
rights accompany a cause of action created by the breach of a
primary right,; the question of who may sue and who may be sued,
the necessity of estimating the quantum of evidence requisite for
success - all matters possessing a procedural aspect - inevitably
affect the outcome of lawsuits.'; It could scarcely be otherwise.
This illustrates the significance of the proposal to change from
one set of rules to another. The proposed replacement of the Field
Code of Civil Procedure by the new North Dakota Rules of Civil
Procedure is the first thorough overhauling of remedial law in this
jurisdiction since the days of territorial status. What results it might
have furnishes ground for interesting speculation. The federal
2. Maitland, Forms of Action 296 (1936).
3. The version then adopted was subsequently amended to conform to the California
revisions of the Field Code of Civil Procedure occurring in 1872. See Ronde v. Stem, 73
N.D. 273, 280-81, 14 N.W.2d 249, 251-52 (1944), for discussion of the intent underlying the adoption of the Field Code.
4. One particular line of attack upon the Field Code has been the objection that its
provisions for joinder of parties and joinder of causes of actions ("claims" under the new
rules) have been antiquated and over-technical. A discussion of this aspect of the new
rules will appear in the following issue of the North Dakota Law Review.
5. For an analysis of the distinction between primary, secondary, and procedural
rights, see 1 Beale, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws 66-86 (1935).
6. Since these things bear on the all-important question of what the court in a given
case will ultimately do, no lawyer can disregard them in advising his client. "The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I
mean by the law." Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 460-61 (1897).
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courts adopted these rules precisely at the time the Supreme Court
of the United States took away their power to independently interpret the substantive law of the states; in 1938, the year the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure came into force, the Court in Erie Ry. v.
Tompkins' wiped out the bulk of the federal common law applicable to the states. Hence substantive state law has not felt the
impact of these new procedural rules as much as might have been
expected.
But if the federal rules, with their liberalized provisions regarding joinder of parties and claims and their third-party procedures,
come into effect in this state, it is readily conceivable that the North
Dakota courts may in time develop some new substantive principles
out of them. For this reason it seems fair to say that no question of
greater long-range potentialities has arisen in the legal system of
this jurisdiction since the Field Code itelf was adopted.
The precise impact of the new rules upon litigation in this state
can scarcely be forecast in detail and this paper does not attempt to
do so. What is planned is simply an attempt to explore some of the
implications of the change and to compare the operation of the new
rules with the case law and the statutes they replace, in an effort to
ascertain how many of the old rules and precedents will retain
validity and what benefits will be derived from the adoption of the
new rules.
For this purpose, an examination of the course by which the new
rules have been developed is indicated.
THE BACKGROUND OF THE NEW RULES
Since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became operative in
the federal court system in 1938, there has been in North Dakota a
steadily-increasing group of practitioners and judges advocating
their adoption here.' The adoption of modernized rules in the federal judiciary system had been preceded by general recognition of
the fact that the Congress, preoccupied with other matters, had
neither the time nor inclination to prescribe an improved procedure
for the courts.9 In the end, therefore, the Federal Rules came into
7. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
8. As illustrated by P. W. Lanier Sr., Should North Dakota Adopt the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure?, 26 N.D. Bar Briefs 153 (1950).
9. Congress had never laid down a specific code of procedure to be followed by the
courts, and procedure in them was regulated at the time of the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure by the Practice Conformity Act, 17 Stat. 197 (1872), which required federal courts to conform as nearly as practicable to procedure in the state courts in
trying actions at law, and the Federal Equity Rules of 1912. Much of the opposition of
opponents of a unified set of rules for the federal courts was motivated by their fear "that
the rather simplified code practice of the western states might be superseded by the in-
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being through the exercise of the rule-making power of the Supreme
Court of the United States - a power recognized, of course, by a
statute enacted only after a long and difficult legislative struggle.
Moved by this example of what might be accomplished, the
North Dakota Legislative Assembly in 1941 enacted a measure
vesting a rule-making authority in the Supreme Court of this state." °
It is clear that before that enactment the Court possessed a limited
rule-making power in any event, since it is an independent and
equal branch of the state government with power to regulate its
own affairs and a supervisory jurisdiction over the business of its
subordinate courts." It had exercised its rule-making power in the
past to prescribe rules for the conduct of its own affairs and also to
govern the conduct of litigation in the district courts in areas not
covered by statute.- 2 But from 1941 until the time of this writing
the broadened authority which the Legislative Assembly gave it
has remained unexercised; the Court has thus far made no move
toward a change in the existing code provisions" regarding procedure.
Explanations for this reluctance to move are not difficult to suggest. For one thing, ii the hands of the Court the Field Code of
Civil Procedure has served this state extremely well, and a sense of
tradition and stability has come to surround it. Most of the problems connected with it have been passed upon by the Court and the
judges of the state are all thoroughly familiar with its principles.
It is also possible that the members of the Court felt they were being asked to undertake an essentially legislative task; a majority of
volved metropolitan practice, which had unfortunately developed in New York City under
later emendations of the code." Clark, Code Pleading 35 (2d ed. 1947). For this reason the
late Senator Walsh of Montana was a vigorous opponent of the enabling act which permitted the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and it was only after his
death removed him from the chairmanship of the Senate Judiciary ,Committee that the
legislation passed For the story, see 1 Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure §4 (1950); Clark, Code Pleading 34 et seq. (2d ed. 1948).
10. N.D. Laws 1941, c. 238.

11. It has often been argued that it is within the authority of the courts to lay down
their own rules of procedure without any legislative mandate to that effect whatever. This
was, for instance, the position of John H. Wigmore, who believed that procedural statutes
violated the principle of separation of powers. See Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for
Judiciary Procedure Are Void Constitutionally, 23 Ill.L. Rev. 276 (1928).
The more
accurate view seems to be otherwise, as evidenced by the scholarly and thoroughly docu-

merted tesearch set forth in Williams, The Source of Authority for Rules of Court Affecting
Procedurer 22 Wash. U. L. Q. 459 (1937). Professor Williams' conclusion is that the
courts may lay down sub-statutory rules, i.e., rules not in conflict with statutory provisions,
in the absence of legislative authority; but that a legislative mandate is necessary before
the rule-making power can be used to supersede statutory provisions.
12. See Volume 41, North Dakota Reports, 705 et seq.
13. Under the rule-making authority granted the North Dakota Supreme Court by the

Legislative Assembly, the fact a rule of procedure is incorporated in a statute does not
withdraw it from the Court's power of alteration or amendment. N.D. Rev. Code §27-0209
(1943). The rule-making authority in this state is what Williams, supra note 11 at 467,
wouT 'all"super-statutory."
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the justices felt that way, it will be remembered, when the Legislative Assembly placed the Committee on Code Revision under their
jurisdiction.14 When the matter is considered in perspective it is not
at all surprising that a Court with a fine tradition of procedural
effectiveness should feel no sense of urgency when asked to depart
from a settled path.
But while the Court thus made haste slowly, many of the provisions of the Federal Rules nevertheless found their way into North
Dakota law by legislative action. In 1943 the Legislative Assembly
adopted the pre-trial conference of the Federal Rules in its entirety,
acting on the recommendation of a committee under the leadership
of Mr. Justice Grimson. 15 Similarly, the Revisors responsible for the
preparation of the North Dakota Revised Code of 1943 - who
were, as noted above, under the authority of the Court - found it
desirable to incorporate many of the federal procedures into the
North Dakota statutory law."
And as the Federal Rules proved themselves successful, the body
of opinion in favor of a shift to them continued to grow. Late in
1953 a committee of the State Bar Association commenced a study
of the, Federal and Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure17 for the
purpose of determining what would be involved in a change in this
state."8 At the same time a committee of the North Dakota Judicial
Council was engaged in a similar study." The activities of these
committees resulted eventually in the formation of an eleven-member joint committee composed of six representatives of the State
Bar Association of North Dakota and five representatives of the
North Dakota Judicial Council which was charged with the function
of drafting a new set of rules for presentation to the Court. "°
On December 15, 1954, the Joint Committee presented a draft of
14. State ex rel. Mason v. Baker, 69 N.D. 488, 288 N.W. 202 (1939).
15. N.D. Laws 1943, c. 216, a measure presently embodied in the North Dakota Revised Code of 1943 as chapter 28-11. The operation of pre-trial conferences in this state
has been thoroughly covered by Mr. Justice Crimson in a survey conducted since that time.
See Grimson, A Progress Report on Pre-Trial Conferences in North Dakota, 30 N.Dak. L.

Rev. 85 (1954).
16. E.g., N.D. Rev. Code §§28-0511, 28-0720, 28-0806, 28-0912, 28-1404, 28-1409,
28-1502, 28-1503, 28-1509 and 28-1510 (1943).
17. The Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure

have been of course, derived

from the

Federal Rules.
18. See Report of the Rules of Civil Procedure Committee to the State Bar Association
of North Dakota,

30 N.Dak.L.Rev. 345 et seq. (1954).

19. Ibid.
20. In

addition to Mr. Frank F.

Jestrab,

Chairman,

the committee was composed of

Judge Eugene A. Burdick, Mr. E. T. Conmy, Mr. Carroll E. Day, Mr. Clyde Duffy, Judge
A. J. Gronna, Mr. Roy A. Ilvedson, Mr. H. A. Mackoff, Mr. Herbert G. Nilles, Mr. Norman G. Tenneson, and Dean 0. H. Thormodsgard of the University of North Dakota
School of Law.
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the new rules to the Court.21. On March 16, 1955, the Court entered
an order directing the commencement of proceedings necessary to
the adoption of the rules. -' In the hearings which followed it proved
necessary to formulate a number of amendments, something accomplished by a supplemental report submitted to the Court on
June 17, 1955.- There the matter has rested since that time.
GENERAL COMMENTS
A few words of general appraisal may well precede specific
discussion of the new rules. They represent, it is submitted, not a
revolution against Field Code procedure but an evolution in it.
Eminent authority has pointed out that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure benefitted substantially from Field Code principles in
their original drafting;2 4 hence the adoption of the new rules would
not represent a departure from the procedural heritage of this state
so much as an enrichment of it.
One noteworthy characteristic of the new rules is their brevity
and compactness. There are only 79 separate rules and several of
these may be considered virtually formal. Yet the rules supersede
a total of 183 statutory provisions, thereby eliminating a very considerable amount of excess wordage as well as simplifying much
statutory language.
The rules are divided into ten subdivisions. These are (1)
Scope of Rules - One Form of Action; (2) Commencement of
Action; Service of Process, Pleadings, Motions and Orders; (3)
Pleadings and Motions; (4) Parties; (5) Depositions and Discovery; (6) Trials; (7) judgment; (8) Provisional and Final
Remordies and Special Proceedings; (9) Appeals; (10) District
Courts and Clerks.
SUGGESTED ADVANTAGES
At least seven advantages have been suggested as following the
adoption of the new rules. These are as follows:
1. They will permit greater simplicity in pleading.
21. See Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of North Dakota 7
(West Publishing Co. 1955).
22. Id. at 8.
23. This is not available in printed form. The proposed original version and the
amended version of the rules involved are indicated where appropriate in the text of this
discussion.
24. "There can be no question but that they (the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure)
represent a present-day interpretation and execution of what are at bottom of Field principles." Clark, Code Pleading and Practice Today, in David Dudley Field Centenary
Essays 64 (1949).
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2. They eliminate 'the element of surprise from actions as much
as possible through their extensive discovery procedures.
3. They will permit resolution of all outstanding issues between
litigants in one proceeding because of the liberalized provisions
governing the union of claims in a single proceeding.
4. They will permit controversies involving numerous parties to
be resolved in a single proceeding because of their liberalized
provisions governing joinder of parties plaintiff and defendant.
5. They will permit controversies involving contingent liabilities
- the situation where is A may recover from B, B may recover
from C - to be settled in a single action because of the third-party
plaintiff and third-party defendant procedures they incorporate.
6. Their adoption would make procedure in the state and
federal courts as uniform as possible, thus keeping the attorney who
is unfamiliar with the federal courts on ground which he knows.
7. The procedure of their adoption is such as to allow them to
be kept continuously up to date, since every improvement in the
Federal Rules will be considered by the Court for adoption in
North Dakota.
SUGGESTED DISADVANTAGES
The disadvantages which might be suggested in connection with
the rules may be listed as follows:,
1. The Field Code of Civil Procedure is a known and familiar
body of law to the judges and attorneys and procedure here has
compared well with procedure elsewhere. Hence there is not the
immediate and pressing necessity for change found in some other
jurisdictions.
2. It would be necessary to discard some old and familiar
terminology and concepts, e.g., "cause of action" and "demurrer,"
since the new rules do not employ them. This might cause confusion
and uncertainty.
3. The North Dakota Supreme Court has interpreted the present
statutes in a sufficient number of cases to supply a considerable
background of precedent. The benefit of some of these interpretations would be lost.
4. Adopting the new rules would make work for judges and
attorneys because it would be necessary to relearn much procedural
law.
Undoubtedly both proponents and opponents of the new rules
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will find numerous points of disagreement with the foregoing
summaries of advantages and disadvantages. They represent simply
the writer's condensation of arguments pro and con.
With these general comments it is possible to turn to an analysis
of the rules themselves.
I. SCOPE OF RULES - ONE FORM OF ACTION
Rule 1. Scope of Rules. These rules govern the procedure in
the district courts in all suits of a civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity, with the exceptions stated in
Rule 81. They shall be construed to secure the25 just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action.
It will be noted that Rule 1 does two separate and distinct things.
The first of these is to indicate the coverage of the new rules. The
second is to indicate the spirit in which the rules should be construed and applied. The second sentence of Rule 1 has therefore
been listed by the Joint Committee as superseding the so-called
"trivial error" statute.
A. Coverage of Rules. The question of the scope of the proposed
rules inevitably raises the question of the extent of the rule-making
power of the Supreme Court itself. It is settled law that the rulemaking power extends only to questions of procedure.2 6 Hence the
new rules do not govern matters of substance and must yield in
the event they conflict with rules which the courts consider
substantive.27 To illustrate the sort of issue which might be litigated,
note that Rule 35 allows parties to demand mental, physical, or
blood examinations of adverse parties in appropriate lawsuits.
Does this infringe a substantive right of personal privacy? The
answer of the United States Supreme Court has been in the
negative,2 8 but of course this ruling is not binding on the courts of
29
this jurisdiction, though of great persuasive force.
The issue of whether a given rule has substantive aspects has
sometimes been a thorny one in the federal courts for obvious
25. The superseded statutory provisions in N.D. Rev. Code §28-0742 (1943): "Trivial
Defects in Pleading or Proceeding to be Disregarded. The court, in every stage of an action,
shall disregard any error or defect in the pleadings or proceedings which shall not affect
the substantial rights of the adverse party and no judgment shall be reversed or affected
b .reason of such error or defect."
26. 1 Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure §138 (1950); 1 Moore,
Federal' Practice §1.03 (1938); Sullivan, A Treatise on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure §7 g (1949).
a
27. "An authority conferred upon a court to make rules of procedure for the exercise of
its jurisdiction is not an authority to enlarge that jurisdiction; and the Act . . . authorizing this Court to prescribe rules of procedure in civil actions gave it no authority tomdy,
abridge or enlarge the substantive rights of litigants.
United States v7Sh
,i7H
312 U.S. 584, 589-90 (1941).
28. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
29. The issue is further explored under the discussion devoted to N.D.R.Civ.P. 35.
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reasons. In cases involving diversity jurisdiction, the federal
judges have been bound under the rule of Erie Ry. v. Tompkins
to apply the substantive law of the state wherein they sit as interpreted and applied by the courts of that state. Their procedure,
however, is naturally regulated by their own rules. It follows that
they do not consider themselves bound by provisions of state law
which are merely procedural; 30 and since they must themselves in
any given case determine whether a specific rule of state law is
procedural and therefore to be disregarded or substantive and
hence binding, a large number of cases have turned on this issue in
the federal courts. It is plain that the question cannot arise in this
precise form in the state courts; but that the general question of
whether a given rule has substantive aspects will on- occasion be
litigated seems obvious.
B. Spirit of Rules. The intention underlying the "trivial error"
statute was to free the courts from the necessity of insisting upon
literal compliance with procedural statutes in situations where. a
failure to follow them to the letter is non-prejudicial. Plainly
enough, this purpose is carried forward by the second sentence of
Rule 1. The precedents which have construed the "trivial error"
statute must obviously be considered, therefore, as continuing to
represent valid law. A representative group of these holding is
3
appended in the margin. 1
30. This is an intentionally oi;er-simplified statement which deserves amplification in a
footnote. The line which the federal courts draw between "substantive" and "procedural"
state law is by no means a black and white one; the federal courts have come to
,recognize that many procedural statutes tend to have a greater or lesser degree of sub.stantive importance. Hence in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), it was
ruled that whether a state statute has been characterized as procedural or substantive, if
it vitally affects the outcome of a diversity jurisdiction case it is to be followed by the
federal courts. In Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947), the Supreme Court therefore required the application of a North Carolina statute even though the Supreme Court
-of North Carolina had held it to be procedural. See also Woods v. Inter-state Realty
Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949), which similarly disregards the substance-procedure dichotomy.
It is impossible, therefore, to make a purely mechanical categorization; the question of
-whether a given state statute will be disregarded as "procedural" is governed essentially
by that statute's impact upon the case before the federal court. See 26 N.D. Bar Briefs
.306 (1950).
31. In James River National Bank v. Haas, 73 N.D. 383, 15 N.W.2d 442 (1944), a
.summons inadvertently captioned a district court action as being brought in the county
court; the error was held immaterial where the accompanying complaint was correctly
captioned. See also. Barnes Amusement Co. v. District Court, 66 N.D. 727, 268 N.W.
897 (1936) (undated summons held valid where no substantial prejudice could be shown
to result from lack of date); Nashua Savings Bank v. Lovejoy, 1 N.D. 211, 46 N.W. 411
(1890) (summons addressed to defendant A omitted name of defendant B, B having been
personally served with a summons addressed to him and the complaint in the case embracing both defendants, held valid where no motion to require the complaint to conform
to the summons had been made in the district court); Hilbish v. Asada, 19 N.D. 684,
125 N.W. 556 (1910)
(affidavit for attachment used "plaintiff" where "defendant"
.should have appeared, held a trivial defect); Braaten v. Grabinski, 77 N.D. 422, 43
N.W.2d 38 (1950) (complaint alleged accident on June 8, evidence of plaintiff showed it
-to have been June 6, variance between pleading and proof held immaterial); Ward v.
Gradin, 15 N.D. 649, 109 N.W. 57 (1906)
(where answer of defendant in a&ion of
-conversion denied plaintiff's ownership of the property involved in the present .tense, and
.strictly construed merely denied plaintiff was the owner on the date of the answer, the
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Rule 2. One Form of Action. There shall be one form of action
to be known as "civil action. '' 2
Rule, 2 should be considered in connection with Rule 1. Read
jointly, they preserve the two basic reforms of the Field Code of
Civil Procedure, the union of law and equity and the abolition of
forms of action. Rule 2 most certainly works no change whatever
in the law of North Dakota, being simply a restatement of the
prior statute; indeed, the notes of the advisory committee which
drafted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the first instance
indicate that Rule 2 was in fact originally derived from the Field
Code. 13
Rule 2 does not cover certain types of special proceedings expressly withdrawn from the coverage of the rules, something also
true of its predecessor, § 32-0109 of the North Dakota Revised
Code of 1943. :14Thus, for example, actions of certiorari 3 or
mandamus 36 will not be governed by the new rules any more than
such actions have been governed by the general provisions regulating civil actions in the past.
The North Dakota courts have repeatedly pointed out that the
abolition of forms of action has no effect upon the substantive rights
of litigants. Thus it does not confer a substantive right of action
on a private citizen in a case where only the state itself has standing
court held no errosl was committed in treating the answer as a full traverse of plaintiff's
ownership); Braithwaite v. Power, 1 N.D. 455, 48 N.W. 35 (1891)
(joint judgment
against joint debtors A and B and the administrator of joint debtor C, attacked on basis
of common law rule that representative of a deceased debtor could not be joined with surviving debtors in one action, held valid since defect was not prejudicial); State v. Van
Home, 71 N.D. 455, 2 N.W.2d 1 (1941)
(erroneous admission of defendant's evidence
held non-prejudicial where total case showed defendant entitled to judgment as a matter of
law); Vidger Co. v. Great Northern Ry., 15 N.D. 501, 107 N.W. 1083 (1906)
(admission of self-serving statement was trivial error where the fact in dispute was later established by undisputed evidence); Moe v. Kettwig, 68 N.W.2d 853 (N.D. 1955) (allegedly
erroneous instruction held non-prejudicial where appellant failed to establish that jury might
have returned a different verdict had the instruction not been given); Cohn v. Wyngarden, 48 N.D. 344, 184 N.W. 575 (1921) (fact juror overheard party to action conversing
with his witness in improper fashion held a trivial defect where juror made affidavit he
decided case on the evidence, since losing party himself caused the error). In Crane v.
First National Bank, 26 N.D. 268, 144 N.W. 96 (1913), the winning party failed to file
for record the judge's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for judgment prior
to the expiration of the judge's term. It was held a new trial was necessary despite the
trivial error statute, the court reasoning that a case is not concluded until the filing of the
findings, conclusion and order, because the judge might change his opinion up to that
time. Hence the majority felt the case had never been concluded and deemed a retrial
necessary. There is a dissenting opinion.
32. The superseded statutory provision is N.D. Rev. Code §32-0109 (1943):
"Civil
Action; One Form; Plaintiff and Defendant Defined. There shall be in this state but one
form of action for the enforcement or protection of private rights and the redress of private
wrongs, which shall be denominated a civil action. In such action the party complaining
shall be known as the plaintiff and the adverse party as the defendant."
33. 1 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure 257 (Rules Ed. 1950).
34. See N.D.R.Civ.P. 1, 81 (a).
35. For discussion of certiorari, see Crum, The Writ of Certiorariin North Dakota, 27
N.Dak.L.Rev. 271 (1951).
36. State ex rel. Dakota Hail Association v. Carry, 2 N.D. 36, 49 N.W. 164 (1891).
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to be heard.37 Nor does it create a right of action in a case where
there simply has not been a breach of a primary substantive right s
Its principal effect stems from the greater flexibility in pleading it
permits, since if the facts pleaded in a complaint show any right to
relief at all the complaint has in the past been treated as sufficient,
even if drafted on the wrong legal theory."5 This plainly will remain
the law.
The union of law and equity is of course merely a procedural
one. They remain separate and distinct bodies of substantive
doctine.1° Thus it will certainly remain possible to plead an
equitable defense to a legal cause of action,4" to secure equitable
relief in cases where the court has assumed jurisdiction at law,'
and to obtain legal relief in actions commenced on the equity side
of the court.4 3 In short, these two rules do not alter the pre-existing
law at all.
II. COMMENCEMENT OF ACTIONS: SERVICE OF PROCESS,
PLEADINGS, MOTIONS AND ORDERS
Rule 3. Commencement of Action. A civil action is commenced
by the service of a summons. 4
A. Comparison with the Federal Rules. North Dakota practice
on the question of commencing actions varies sharply from procedure under the Federal Rules. In the federal courts civil actions
are commenced by the filing of a complaint with the court.', 5 In

37. Wishek v. Becker, 10 N.D. 63, 84 N.W. 590 (1900).
38. "What was intended to be accomplished by the sweeping declaration that all distinctions should be destroyed was not any change in the substantive law, but merely an
alteration in the manner of setting forth causes of action in the plaintiff's pleading ...
True it is that the distinctions between actions, so far as the mode of setting forth the
cause of action is concerned, have been done away with and now the facts are to be
stated in every case alike. But whether the facts so alleged constitute any cause of action
at all is to be determined by the substantive law, and this law has not been changed by
the code.'" Corliss, C. J. in Black v. Minneapolis & Northern Elevator Co., 7 N.D. 129,
133, 73 N.W. 90, 91 (1897).
39. Hellebust v. Bonde, 42 N.D. 324, 172 N.W. 812 (1919) (complaint insufficient to
state cause of action for fraud nevertheless good as pleading cause of action for money
had and received); Rott v. Goehring, 33 N.D. 413, 157 N.W. 294 (1916) (whether
complaint pleaded cause of action for alienation of affections and criminal conversation,
or merely for alienation of affections, held immaterial; plaintiff was entitled to recover if
facts pleaded showed any right to relief); Varnes v. Schwartz, 50 N.D. 511, 197 N.W.
129 (1924) semble.
40. Schafer v. Olson, 50 N.D. 1, 132 N.W. 645 (1921).
41. Shary v. Eszlinger, 45 N.D. 133, 176 N.W. 938 (1920); L. W. Wentzel Implement Co. v. State Finance Co., 63 N.W.2d 525 (N.D. 1954).
42. L. W. Wentzel Implement Co. v. State Finance Co., supra note 41; Burrows v.
Paulson, 64 N.D. 557, 254 N.W. 471 (1934); Shary v. Eszlinger, supra note 41.
43. Burrows v. Paulson, supra note 42.
44. The superseded statutory provision is N.D. Rev. Code §28-0501 (1943): "Civil
Action; How Commenced. Civil Action in the courts of this state shall be commenced
by the service of a summons."
45. Fed. R. Civ. P. 3.
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this jurisdiction an action may be commenced without the interven46
tion of the court at all.
While the federal practice has some attractive features, it is
submitted that the action of the North Dakota committee in retaining the former rule has an extremely sound basis. The argument
for the federal practice has been that greater certainty is attained
with respect to the establishment of priorities 7 and tolling the
statute of limitations and that the federal procedure makes the
commencement of actions a matter of public record. The argument
based on the statute of limitations and establishment of priorities
does not appear sustainable as applied to this state. Section 28-0138
of the North Dakota Revised Code of 1943 halts the running of the
statute of limitations when the summons is delivered to the sheriff
and uses language which indicates the action would also be deemed
to commence for purpose of priority of rights in the same manner.
It thus deals with that problem very neatly.
The argument for the North Dakota rule is that it is simpler,
faster, more convenient for practitioners, and less expensive because
of its comparative informality. It is certainly less cumbersome
than the federal procedure, since it is not necessary under the
North Dakota practice to have the summons served by an official.
Similarly it is not necessary to have someone especially appointed
for the purpose. Virtually anyone save a party in interest is competent to make personal service.4 8 The question of whether to adopt
the service of process or the filing of a complaint as the starting
point of an action was much debated when the Federal Rules were
drafted.4 9 On balance it seems that the Advisory Committee which
drafted the Federal Rules reached a conclusion possessing 'fewer
advantages for the practitioner and the litigant than the Joint
Committee reached for this state.
B. Effect of Issuance of Summons. For other purposes beside the
tolling of the statute of limitations, actions are deemed to commence
in this state before a summons is actually served. When a summons
has been drawn and signed with the intent that it be served, the
rule in this state is that it is deemed to have been "issued" even
though it remains in the hands of the attorney. 50 Issuance alone
46. "Under civil procedure in this state an action may be instituted and relief sought
without filing papers in the office of the clerk of court."

Schaff v. Kennelly, 61 N.W.2d

538, 543 (N.D. 1953).
47. 1 Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure §161 (Rules ed. 1950).
48. See N.D. Rev. Code §28-0619 (1943); N.D.R.C.P. 4 (c) (1).
49. See note 47, supra.

50. Johnson v. Engelhard, 45 N.D. 11, 176 N.W. 134 (1919); Smith v. Nicholson, 5
N.D. 426, 67 N.W. 296 (1896).
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confers a qualified vitality upon the instrument and it will support
proceedings of attachments' and garnishment."
C. Operation of the Statute of Limitations. As noted above,
one method of stopping the expiration of a statute of limitations is
to place a summons in the hands of the sheriff for service. Another
is to actually make service, since it is generally held that the statute
of limitations stops running when service is made. 5 But one complicating aspect of this rule should be mentioned.
Statutes of limitation normally run only against causes of
action54 and the summons has nothing to do with these. It is used
for the purpose of establishing jurisdiction. The nature of the cause
of action involved in a case is most plainly not indicated by the
summons at all; it is the complaint which establishes it. This
situation creates a logical difficulty in those cases where the
complaint is filed or served only after service of the summons.
Quite evidently the cause of action established by the complaint is
deemed to relate back to the time of service of process for purpose
of determining when the statute of limitations becomes applicable.
But what happens when the process is served before a statute of
limitations has run and the complaint is filed or amended to state a
valid claim only afterward? The Supreme Court of New York has
held that the complaint must also be served or filed prior to the
expiration of the statutory period or the action will be barred
notwithstanding the service of a summons. 5 It is similarly the
general rule that an amendment to a complaint after the period of
limitation has expired may not be used for the purpose of setting up
a new cause of action, though it is perfectly permissible to
aid one already pleaded.56
There appear to be no cases in North Dakota dealing specifically with this question 7 and the law in this respect must therefore
be considered uncertain. Logically, however, the New York holding
51. Cases cited note 50, supra.
52. Citizens State Bank v. Smeland, 48 N.D. 466, 184 N.W. 987 (1921); N.D. Rev.
Code §32-0906 (1943). But see also N.D. Rev. Code §32-0909 (1943).
53. Hoegh v. Miller, 190 Iowa 557, 180 N.W. 653 (1920); Haack v. Pollei, 134
Minn. 78, 158 N.W. 908 (1916); Note, Cause of Action and Amendments After the
Statute of Limitations Has Run, 22 Iowa L. Rev. 128, 134 (1936).
54. Statutes of limitations will operate against "claims," of course, under the new
rules.
55. Moses v. Benjamin, 185 Misc. 50, 55 N.Y.S.2d 743 (Sup. Ct. 1945). But cf.
Importers & Exporters Ins. Co. v. Farris, 181 Okla. 339, 73 P.2d 831 (1937).
56. Note, 22 Iowa L. Rev., 128 (1936).
57. In James River Nat. Bank v. Haas, 73 N.D. 374, 15 N.W.2d 442 (1944), the
North Dakota Supreme Court permitted the amendment of a summons after the statute of
limitations had run, relying in part on cases involving amendments of other pleadings,

such as the complaint, in similar situations. This is as close as the court has come to
considering the question so far as this research has disclosed.
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is a sound one. If the nature of the case has not been indicated by
a complaint prior to the expiration of the statutory period, the
defendant has not been warned of the issues to be raised against
him and has thus not had the opportunity to preserve his evidence
which it is one of the aims of the statute to secure. On the other
hand, where amendments are concerned it is traditional to follow a
policy of liberality. The view which the commentators have
approved is that if'a complaint, though defective, informs a defendant of the general nature of the case against him, it may be
amended after the period of the statute has run to state a valid
case.5"
D. Effect of Summons as Fixing Venue. The North Dakota
Court held in Dillage v. Lincoln National L. Ins. Co.' 9 that the
proper venue of an action is determined as of the time the action
is commenced by service of the summons. Hence a party later
brought into the action by interpleader was not entitled to an
order changing the venue as a matter of legal right. This case
will presumably be of considerable importance in connection with
the third-party proceedings contemplated by the new rules.o
Rule 4. Process.
(a) Summons, Contents and Issuance. The summons shall
specify the venue of the court in which the action is brought,
contain the title of the action specifying the names of the
parties, and be directed to the defendant. It shall state the
time within which these rules require the defendant to appear
and defend, and shall notify him that in case of his failure
to do so judgment by default will be rendered against him
for the relief demanded in the complaint. It shall be dated and
subscribed by the plaintiff or his attorney, who shall add
to his signature his post office address."1
It is safe to say that in common with the other rules thus far
examined, Rule 4 (a) undertakes merely a restatement of previous
practice. It should be read in connection with Rule 4 (h), allowing
the amendment of process. It sometimes happens that errors creep
into the contents of a summons and when this happens the question
of amendability becomes very important.
The North Dakota Court has apparently been quite ready to
permit amendments to even this fundamental instrument. In the
58. Note. 22 Iowa L. Rev. 128 (1936); Clark, Code Pleading §118 (2d ed. 1947).
Judge Clark states that in all but a few jurisdictions "the amendment is allowed if it
refers to the same general aggregate of operative facts upon which the original complaint
was based."
59. 54 N.D. 312, 209 N.W. 656 (1926).
60. See the discussion under Rule 14.
61. The superseded statutory provisions are N.D. Rev. Code §§28-0502, 28-0503,
28-3001 (1934). Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (a) is so different no point is served by comparison.
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eyes of the Court it is quite evident that, as Justice Burr once remarked, "There is nothing sacrosanct about a summons."'. It is,
however, necessary that the instrument be jurisdictionally sufficient
in the first instance, since if the summons is so defective as to be
void, no lawsuit is commenced by its service and hence the courts
lack jurisdiction to entertain any motions to amend in the first
instance. '
Which portions of the summons are jurisdictional? At times
the Court has by way of dictum seemed to state a strict requirement. "Our summons. . .must specify the court and county in
which the action is brought, and thus advise the defendant in what
court he is being sued. It must specify the names and parties to the
action, so that the defendant may know that he is a party against
whom the action is brought, and it must be subscribed by the
plaintiff or his attorney, who is required to add to his signature his
post office address, and thus advise the defendant who is seeking
redress against him and where that person or his attorney may be
found."134
An examination of the actual course of the decisions indicates
that in some instances the requirements set forth above are not
unvarying. Thus it has been held that where a summons inadvertently lists an action as being brought in the county instead
of the district court, it may be amended as long as prejudice has
not resulted. 65 In Nashua .Savings Bank v. Lovejoy," a summons
served upon a defendant happened to omit the name of a co-defendant, such co-defendant having been personally served with a
summons addressed to him; the complaint in the case embraced
both defendants. The summons was upheld. The summons need
not be dated to be valid." Nor need it be personally signed by the
attorney in his own handwriting; the name of the attorney typed
by a clerk is sufficient so long as the attorney adopts it as his
signature."' In cases where the complaint is not served with the
summons both the code and the new rules concur in requiring the
summons to state that the complaint is or will be filed with the
clerk of court; but the omission of such statement is not jurisdiction62. James River Nat. Bank v. Haas, 73 N.D. 374, 381, 15 N.W.2d 442, 445 (1944).
63. Coman v. Williams, 78 N.D. 560, 50 N.W.2d 494 (1951); James River Nat. Bank
v. Haas, supra note 62.
64. Coman v. Williams, 78 N.D. 560, 50 N.W.2d 494 (1951)."
65. James River Nat. Bank v. Haas, 73 N.D. 374, 15 N.W.2d 442 (1944).
66. 1 N.D. 211, 46 N.W. 411 (1890).
67. Barnes Amusement Co. v. District Ct., 66 N.D. 727, 268 N.W. 897 (1936).
68. Hagen v. Gresby, 34 N.D. 349, 159 N.W. 3 (1916).
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al error.t 9 Whether a misstatement of the time within which an
answer must be served, appearing in the summons, will invalidate
it, is unsettled.7" On principle it should not, because in many cases
the code itself prescribes a form which misstates the time for preparing an answer. 7 '
(b) Summons Served with or Without Complaint. A copy
of the complaint need not be served with the summons. In
such case the summons shall state that the complaint is
or will be filed with the clerk of the district court in the
county in which the action is commenced, and if the defendant
within 20 days after service of the summons causes notice of
appearance to be given and in person or by an attorney demands in writing a copy of the complaint, specifying a place
within the state where it may be served, a copy thereof within
20 days thereafter must be served accordingly. If in such case
the complaint is not filed with the clerk within 20 days after
service of the summons the action will be deemed discontinued.72
This rule alters the time period for filing a complaint in those
cases where the complaint is not served with the summons, shortening it from 30 to 20 days. Beyond that it makes no change in the
law of this state. It should be read in connection with Rule 6 (e),
which doubles the stated period when service is made by mail. As
noted in the comment to Rule 4 (a), above, omission of the statement that the complaint is or will be filed with the clerk of court
does not defeat the jurisdictional validity of the summons.
(c) By Whom Served. The summons may be served:
(1) Within the state by any person of legal age not a party
to the action.
(2) In any other state, territory or foreign country, when
authorized by these rules, service may be made in the same
manner as if such service were made within the state, except
that such service must be made by a resident or citizen of
the State of North Dakota, or by a sheriff, deputy sheriff,
constable, deputy constable or other officer having like powers
and duties of the place in which service is made, or by
an attorney, counselor-at-law, solicitor, advocate or barrister
duly qualified to practice law in such place, or by an officer
69. See N.D.R.C.P. 4 (b), infra; N.D. Rev. Code §28-0504 (1943).
70. Chittenden & Eastman Co. v. Sell, 58 N.D. 664, 227 N.W. 188 (1929).
71. The form of summons contained in N.D. Rev. Code §28-0503 (1943) requires that
an answer be served thirty days after service of the summons. "As a matter of fact, a
recital in the summons that a copy of the answer must be served within thirty days after
the service thereof would be inaccurate because the answer need only be served within
thirty days after the service of the copy of the complaint." Barnes Amusement Co. v.
District Ct., 66 N.D. 727, 734, 268 N.W. 897, 901 (1935). See also Murphy v. Missouri & Kansas Land & Loan Co., 22 N.D. 336, 133 N.W. 913 (1911).
72. The superseded statutory provisions are N.D. Rev. Code §§28-0504, 28-0505
(1943). Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (b) is so different no point is served by comparison.
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authorized by the laws of this state to
7 take acknowledgements
of deeds to be recorded in this state. '
Rule 4 (c) substantially revises the subject-matter of the statute
it supersedes. Sub-paragraph (2) is new material dealing with a
subject not previously covered by the code.74 References to the
service of process by the sheriff which appeared in the prior statute
have been omitted, evidently on the theory the statutes make
adequate provisions on these subjects elsewhere. 7
7
The rule retains the basic policy that any person of legal age 1
is competent to serve a summons so long as that person is not a
party to the action. May an attorney do so on behalf of his client?
The answer is undoubtedly in the affirmative under the terms of
this rule, but it would seem better policy not to do so. The question
of whether valid service has been made can readily become a hotly
contested issue in some actions and there is a provision in the
Canons of Ethics to the effect that an attorney should not act as
counsel for a party in a case where his testimony is needed for any
77
but formal matters.
'
the Court ruled that service of a summons
In Froling v. Farrars
by a person who was not a formal party but could have readily
been joined as a party plaintiff was invalid. In that case a husband
and wife jointly operated a collection agency. An account was
assigned to the wife for collection on behalf of the agency and the
husband served the summons. The court described the husband as
a real party in interest 7" and accordingly ruled that no jurisdiction
over the defendant had been obtained.
Fed. R.
73. The superseded statutory provision is N.D. Rev. Code §28-0619 (1943).
Civ. P. 4 (c) provides that service of process in federal courts shall be made by a marshal,
for
that
purpose.
appointed
by
the
court
deputy marshal, or someone especially
74. The code makes reference to personal service of process outside the state, N.D.
Rev. Code §28-0624 (1943), hut does not state who is entitled to make it. Presumptively
any person authorized to make service under the law of the jurisdiction where the defendant may be found is entitled to do so. Certainly peace officers of the foreign jurisdiction
have been competent agents for this purpose in the past. Kaull v. Johnson, 56 N.D. 563,
218 N.W. 606 (1928). This provision of the rules spells the matter out in detail for the
first time.
75. E.g., N.D. Rev. Code §§11-1507, 11-1512, 11-1513, 11-1514, 28-2606 (1943)
(fees of sheriff).
76. This is, of course, 21 for males and 18 for females. N.D. Rev. Code §14-1001
(1943).
77. A.B.A. Canons of Professional Ethics 19, 27 N.Dak.L.Rev. 243, 250 (1951). Cases
in which controversy has arisen over whether service of process was made are Baird v.
Ellison, 70 N.D. 261, 293 N.W. 794 (1940); Odland v. O'Keeffe Implement Co., 59
N.D. 335, 229 N.W. 923 (1930); Marin v. Potter, 15 N.D. 284, 107 N.W. 970 (1906);
In none of these cases save
and Yorke v. Yorke, 3 N.D. 343, 55 N.W. 1095 (1893).
Yorke v. Yorke did the attorney actually participate in the process of making service.
78. 77 N.D. 639, 44 N.W.2d 763 (1950).
79. Logically, of course, a holding that a person is a real party in interest means that
the action must be brought in his name; the action was not so brought in the Froling
case. It would seem to the writer that if a person qualifies as a permissive plaintiff, a
service carried out by him would be invalid whether he technically qualified as a real
party in interest or not.
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Within the meaning of this rule, service by registered mail is
not personal service, though an ingenious argument to this effect
was adduced in an early case."'
(d) Personal Service in the State. Personal service" within
the state shall be made as follows:
(1) Upon an individual over the age of 14 years, by
delivering a copy of the summons to him personally or delivering a copy thereof at his dwelling house or usual place of
abode in the presence of some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein, or by delivering a copy of the
by appointment or by law
summons to an agent authorized
2
to receive service of process.1
(2) Upon an individual under the age of 14 years, by
delivering a copy of the summons to his guardian, if he has
one within the state, and if not, then to his father or mother
or other person having his care or control, or with whom be
resides, or in whose service he is employed.-'
(3) Upon an individual who has been judicially adjudged
incompetent or for whom a guardian of his person or estate
has been appointed in this state, by delivering a copy of the
summons to him and a copy thereof to his guardian. 4
(4) Upon a domestic or foreign corporation or upon a partnership or other unincorporated association, by delivering a
copy of the summons to an officer, director, superintendent
or managing or general agent, or partner, or associate, or
to any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to
receive service of process and, if the agent is one authorized
by statute to receive service and the statute so requires,
by also mailing a copy to the defendant. If the sheriff shall
make return that no person upon whom service may be made
can be found in the county, then service may be made by
leaving a copy of the summons at any office of the domestic
or foreign corporation, partnership or unincorporated association within this state with the, person in charge of such office.8 5
(5) Upon a city, village, township, school district, park
district, county or other public corporation, by delivering a
80. Clyde v. Johnson, 4 N.D. 92, 58 N.W. 512 (1895).

But see N.D.)

R.C.P. 45 (c)

as to subpoenas.
28-0616
81. The superseded statutory provisions are N.D. Rev. Code §§28-0601,
(1943), defining what constitutes personal service in this state. The language used differs
considerably from that used in Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (d).
The
82. The superseded statutory provision is N.D. Rev. Code §28-0610 (1943).
language used substantially follows that of Fed.R.Civ.P. 4 (d) (1), with the exception
that the Federal Rules would classify a person as a minor if he were below the age of 21.
The
83. The superseded statutory provision is N.D. Rev. Code §28-0602 (1943).
language used differs from the Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (d) (2), which refers the question of
service upon minors and incompetents to state law.

84. The superseded statutory provision is N.D. Rev. Code §28-0603

(1943).

See note

83, supra. The language of this rule substantially follows that of the code.
85. This rule supersedes N.D. Rev. Code §§28-0606, 28-0607, 28-0608, and 28-0609
(1943). It is a hybrid, derived from Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (d) (4) and also, in part, rom
the superseded statutes. See the text discussion.
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copy of the surpmons to any member of the governing board
thereofi s a
(6) Upon the state by delivering a copy of the summons
to the governor or attorney general or an assistant attorney
general and upon an agency of the state, such as the Bank of
North Dakota or the State Mill and Elevator Association, by
delivering a copy of the summons to the managing head of
such agency or to the attorney general or an assistant attorney
general."7
The six sub-sections of this rule deal with service of process upon
individuals generally, minors, incompetents, business associations,
municipal corporations and the state. In general the rule carries
forward without substantial change a group of statutes which
appear to have caused little conflict in most cases; in any event
cases construing the meaning of the superseded statutes appear
to involve, with one exception, comparatively minor problems.88
The exception involves personal service upon foreign corporations, a vexed problem in this as well as many other jurisdictions.
Rule 4 (d) (4) supersedes four lengthy sections of the code dealing
with service upon various types of foreign and domestic business
associations and replaces them with a single paragraph noteworthy
for its brevity and conciseness. At present the code provides several
alternative methods of serving a foreign corporation. One of these
is to deliver the summons to somone specifically authorized to
receive service on behalf of the corporation, 9 such as the Secretary
of State or the Insurance Commissioner. Another is to serve the
summons upon one of certain enumerated officers of the foreign
86. The superseded statutory provision is N.D. Rev. Code §28-0604 (1943).
The
language of this .rule is derived from the cited statute.
87. The superseded statutory provision is N.D. Rev. Code §28-0605 (1943).
The
language of this rule is derived from the cited statute.
88. There are few cases dealing with the question of what constitutes personal service.
Phelps v. McCollam, 10 N.D. 536, 88 N.W. 292 (1901), holds that where a husband had
left the state intending to live elsewhere permanently, the service of a summons naming
him as a defendant upon his wife while the wife was staying temporarily with neighbors
in this state did not confer jurisdiction, since the home of a man's neighbors is not his
own "dwelling place" within the meaning of the statutes relating to personal service.
Presumably this will continue to be the law under N.D.R.Civ.P. 4 (d)
(1).
No cases
dealing with service of process on minors, incompetents, or municipal corporations have
been found in the reports. Two cases have been unearthed dealing with service upon the
state. In Company A v. State, 58 N.D. 66, 224 N.W. 661 (1929), service of process in
an action against the state was not made on the governor or attorney general as required
by the statute on the books at that time. With scant discussion, the court held the judgment in the action of no force or effect. In Bonniwell v. Flanders, 62 N.W.2d 25 (N.D.
1954), it was held that neither the Attorney General nor the State Highway Commissioner had authority to waive service of process upon them in the manner prescribed by
statute for the purpose of allowing a litigant to have recourse from the Unsatisfied Judgment Fund.
89. Reference should be made to N.D. Rev. Code §10-1733 (1943)
as well as to
§§28-0607, 28-0608, and 28-0609. The first-cited provision remains in force and unaffected by the new rules, and provides an alternative method of service upon foreign
corporations. Logically it would seem that it should be consolidated with the other provisions dealing with this subject.
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corporation within the state, ° but this is effective only when these
officers are engaged in the transaction of business here on behalf
of the corporation. A third method is also available. When one cannot find any of the enumerated officers within the state engaged
in doing business for a foreign corporation, the code provides that
one may make service of process on "any person... within this
state acting as the agent of .. .such corporation"" - but only
on the condition that the corporation possess property within this
state or that the cause of action arose here. These three alternative
methods are all preserved by Rule 4 (d) (4).
When service upon one who is merely an ordinary agent "2 is
relied upon as conferring jurisdiction in personan over a foreign
corporation, some constitutional issues arise centering about the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. There are
obvious hardships imposed on a foreign corporation when it is
made subject to service in any jurisdiction where any agent it has
may be located. In the past the rule has been that such service
was valid only when the corporation was "present" within the
jurisdiction where service was made.' The corporate "presence"
- concededly a fiction' - was manifested by engaging in business
within the state. Traditionally the corporation has been deemed
"present" when its activities consist of solicitation of orders to
be
filled elsewhere plus some sort of additional activity.95 In 1945
this position was modified by the Supreme Court of the United
States, which imposed a different test for the determination of
jurisdictional questions relating to foreign corporations.
As the law presently stands, the assertion of jurisdiction over a
foreign corporation by a state does not depend upon the idea of
"presence" but upon whether the corporation has carried on
activities within the state of such a nature that the exercise of
jurisdiction can be justified as "reasonable" by the constitutional
90. These officials are the president, secretary, cashier, treasurer, any director, or a
"managing agent." Service upon a "managing agent" should be distinguished from service
upon an ordinary agent, such as a salesman. See Brown v. Chicago, M. & St. P. By., 12
N.D. 61, 95 N.W. 153 (1903); Bauer v. Union C. Life Ins. Co., 22 N.D. 435, 133 N.W.
988 (1911); luver v. Middlewest Grain Co., 44 N.D. 210, 173 N.W. 468 (1919).
91. N.D. Rev. Code §28-0608 (1943).
92. See note 90, supra.
93. Brevick v. Cunard S.S. Co., 63 N.D. 210, 247 N.W. 373 (1933); Wheeler v.
Boyer Fire Apparatus Co., 63 N.D. 403, 248 N.W. 521 (1933); Ellsworth v. MartindaleHubbell Law Directory, 65 N.D. 297, 258 N.W. 486 (1935); Anderson v. Page & Hill
Homes, 88 F.Supp. 408 (D.
.D. 1950).
94. MeBaine, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations: Actions Arising Out of Acts
Done Within the Forum, 34 Calif. L. Rev. 331, 332 (1946).
95. This is the so-called "solicitation plus" rule, a famous old standby in the field of
corporate law.
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standards implied in the due process clause.9' There is thus no
mechanical or quantitative test which can be applied; the inquiry
is simply whether "fair play and substantial justice" indicates that
the corporation can reasonably be required to respond to the process. In this connection "An 'estimate of the inconveniences' which
would result to the corporation from a trial away from its home
or principal place of business is relevant..."This does not mean that the old rule to the effect that a corporation is not amenable to the jurisdiction of a state unless its
activities amount to "solicitation plus" has gone by the boards
completely; the precedents dealing with service under the former
rule still retain a high degree of relevance in determining whether
"fair play and substantial justice" will be served by upholding the
effectiveness of process issued against a foreign corporation. The
North Dakota cases have turned, for the most part, on the "solicitation plus" test, and these precedents undoubtedly still represent the
law even after the change in the position of the United States
Supreme Court.
The most striking local decision is Wheeler v. Boyer Fire Apparatus Co.,-" decided in 1933. This case held that when a foreign
corporation employed a salesman to systematically solicit
orders which resulted in a "continuous flow" of shipments into
the state, service might be made on the corporation by delivering a
summons to the salesman, so long as the cause of action arose
within North Dakota. The opinion appears to go as far in upholding
the jurisdiction of the North Dakota courts as is constitutionally
permissible, and the federal district court of North Dakota has
commented that the' decision actually involved a set of facts in
which more than mere solicitation was present, since the salesman
was authorized "to make settlement in the name of the foreign
corporation and . . . to promptly make collections." 99 The syllabus
of the court in the Wheeler case, however, announced its holding
without reference to these factors.
In Ellsworth v. Martindale-HubbellLaw Directory,0 0 the Court
found the problem which confronted it somewhat less difficult to
resolve. This was an action for libel by an attorney who made
service upon the foreign corporation by delivering the summons
96. International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S.
97. 326 U.S. at 317.

310 (1945).

98. 63 N.D. 403, 248 N.W. 521 (1933).
99. See Anderson v. Page & Hill Homes, 88 F.Supp. 408, 411 (D. N.D. 1950).
100. 65 N.D. 297, 258 N.W. 486 (1935).
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to a salesman within this state. Since the duties of the salesman
were not confined to mere solicitation, but also included gathering
information intended for ultimate use in the directory, the Court
quite logically took the position the defendant was doing business
here, since it was engaged in securing a part of its stock in trade.
Justice Nuessle added that, "It is clear that the mere solicitation of
business within a state by an agent for a foreign corporation does
not constitute engaging in business so as to make the corporation
present there in the sense that is essential to a valid service upon
it. " "'0 This statement, of course, somewhat weakens the force of the
Wheeler decision.
One significant change which Rule 4 (d) (4) makes in -the
present law is the elimination of the requirement found in the
existing statutes that where service is made upon a foreign corporation the cause of action must have arisen in the state or the corporation must have property here. 102 This would appear to broaden
the possibilities of suits against foreign corporations in the state,
but how far the new rule can be pushed in the face of the current
Supreme Court doctrine is doubtful.
(e) Personal Service Outside the State. Personal service""
outside the state may be made:
(1) In any action, upon an individual over the age of 18
years who is domiciled ii this state, by delivering a copy of the
summons to him personally.' ° .
(2) In any action, upon a person domiciled in this state,
other than a natural person, by delivering a copy of the
summons in the manner provided by this rule for personal
service upon such person in this state. 1 5
(3) When any natural person or persons not residing in
this state shall engage in business in this state, in any action
against such person or persons arising out of such business,
by delivering a copy of the summons to the person who at the
time of service is in charge of any business in which the defendant or defendants are engaged within this state, if there is
such, and such service shall be of the same force and effect
as if served personally within the state upon the said defendant
101. Id. at 302-03, 258 N.W. at 488.
102. The requirement is neatly illustrated by Brevick v. Cunard S.S. Co., 63 N.D. 210,
The plaintiff purchased a ticket in North Dakota for transpor247 N.W. 373 (1933).
tation to France and then Norway. The defendant did not permit his to disembark in
France. It was held the cause of action had not arisen in this jurisdiction since the
breach of contract had occurred in France.
103. The superseded statutory provision is N.D. Rev. Code §28-0616 (1943). No comparable provision is found in the Federal Rules.
104. This is new. Possibly it may be regarded as superseding N.D. Rev. Code §28-0621
(1943), though the Joint Committee does not list it as doing so. See the text discussion
infra.
No com105. The superseded statutory provision is N.D. Rev. Code §28-0606 (1943).
parable provision is found in the Federal Rules.
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or defendants so engaging in business in this state provided
that a copy of such summons together with a notice of such
service upon such persons in charge of such business pursuant
to the provisions of this subsection shall be sent forthwith to
such nonresident person or persons by registered return receipt
requested mail. The plaintiff shall file with the clerk of the
district court in which such action is pending an affidavit
of compliance herewith, a copy of the summons and either
a return receipt purporting to be signed by the defendant or
defendants, or person qualified to receive his or their registered
mail in accordance with the rules and custom of the postoffice
department; or if acceptance was refused by the defendant or
defendants or his or their agent, an affidavit by or on behalf of
the plaintiff that notice of such mailing refusal was forthwith
sent to the defendant or defendants by ordinary mail. The
foregoing papers shall be filed within 30 days after the return
receipt or other official proof of delivery or the original envelope bearing the notation of refusal, as the case may be, is
received by the plaintiff. Service of process shall be complete
5 days after such papers are filed.
Service may also be made by delivering a copy of the
summons with the person who at the time of service is in
charge of the business of any such nonresident defendant
or defendants within this state and by delivering a copy thereof
to the defendant or defendants personally pursuant to subdivision (c) (2) of this rule. Proof of such personal service
shall be filed with the Clerk of Court and service shall be
complete five days after proof therof is filed.
If there is no person within the state in charge of any
business of the defendant or defendants, then service may be
made pursuant to the provisions of subdivision (c) (2) of this
rule."o'
A. Domicil as a basis of jurisdiction. Rule 4 (e) (1) adopts
107
specifically the rule of the famed case of Milliken v. Meyer,
decided in 1940 by the United States Supreme Court. In that case,
a plaintiff sued a defendant domiciled in Wyoming, the action
being brought in the Wyoming court. Service of process was made
personally on the defendant in the state of Colorado, and was
upheld as valid. The opinion has been expressed that under the
provisions of the code a similar service could be made which the
North Dakota courts would accept as sufficient."os The North
Dakota Supreme Court has laid it down that in an action where
106. This is new materiad.

See the text discussion infra.

107. 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
108. See Gronna, Domicil of Absent Defendant Is a Basis for in Persona,

Jurisdiction.

24 N.D. Bar Briefs 4 (1948).
Judge Gronna based his argument to the effect that
Milliken v. Meyer was in force in this state on N.D. Rev. Code §§28-0620 and 28-0621

(1943).

This is the reason for the comment in note 104.
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a personal judgment for money is sought, the defendant "must be
brought within the jurisdiction of the court by service of process
within the state, or by his voluntary appearance in the action," or
the judgment will be violative of the due process clause.l °s This
decision, however, did not involve out-of-state service on a domiciliary and was handed down before Milliken v. Meyer was decided.
There thus seems little doubt that Rule 4 (e) (1) is constitutional.
B. Service on agents. Rule 4 (e) (3) appears to be unclear in
its language, though the intent is plain enough. In 1935 the United
States Supreme Court ruled in Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman"0 that an individual living in New York but carrying on
business in the state of Iowa through an agent could be subjected
to the jurisdiction of the Iowa courts through service of process on
the agent in Iowa, where the cause of action involved grew out of
the business transacted in Iowa. Rule 4 (e) (3) was plainly meant
to adopt the rule of that case., Read literally, however, the rule
would appear to say that one could make service of process on
the agent outside the state."' If it was the intention of the Joint
Committee to so provide, it seems doubtful that the rule could be
considered valid." 12 Thus, if A is agent of P, and is served with
North Dakota process in Minnesota, it would seem clear that P
could not be considered bound by such service. Conversely, if
A is served with process in North Dakota in a case arising out of
A's activities on behalf of P in this state, Rule 4 (e) (3) makes it
clear that P is bound by such service.
One interesting question arises when one considers the possibility
that the agent might be domiciled in this state. In such a situation,
is service upon him outside the state pursuant to the provisions of
Rule 4 (e) (1) also binding on the principal? There seems no
logical reason why an affirmative answer should not be given.
(f) Other Service. Whenever a statute of this state or an
order of the court provides for the service of a summons
or a notice or of an order in lieu of summons upon
a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state, service
109. Darling & Co. v. Burchard, 69 N.D. 212, 284 N.W. 856 (1939), syll. 7.
110. 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
111. Note that the introductory sentence of rule 4 (e) states that personal service
"outside" the state may be made as provided in rule 4 (e) (3). At the same time, the
language of rule 4 (e) (3) itself is ambiguous. It states that service may be made by
delivering a copy of the summons to an agent in charge of business "within this state."
An agent may be in charge of business "within this state" though living in another
jurisdiction.
112. See Restatement, Judgments 79 et seq. (1942), and particularly Restatement,
Judgments §22 (1942), containing a clear discussion of this subject matter.
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shall be made under the circumstances and in the manner
prescribed by the statute, rule, or order.' "
This is plainly a mere catch-all provision, designed to make it
plain that the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure do not
supersede other methods of service prescribed by other sections of
the code.
(g) Service by Publication; When Permitted.
(1) The summons may be served upon any defendant by
publication in the following cases:
1. When the defendant is not a resident of this state;
2. When the defendant is a foreign corporation, joint stock
company, or association, and has no agent or other person in
this state upon whom personal service can be made;
3. When the defendant is a domestic corporation which has
forfeited its charter or right to do business in this state or
has failed to file its annual report as required by law; 1' or
4. When personal service cannot be made upon such defendant in this state to the best knowledge, information, and
belief of the person making the affidavit mentioned in subdivision (g) (2) of this rule, and such affidavit is accompanied
by the return of the sheriff of the county in which the action
is brought, stating that after diligent inquiry for the purpose
of serving such summons he is unable to make personnal
service thereof upon such defendant."1
(2) Filing of Complaint and Affidavit for Service by publication. Before service of the summons by publication is authorized in any case, there shall be filed with the clerk of the
district court of the county in which the action is commenced
a complaint setting forth a claim in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant and also an affidavit stating one of the
grounds for service by publication specified in subdivision
(g) (1) of this rule and also stating the place of defendant's
residence, if known to the affiant, and if not known, stating
that fact, and also stating, unless the complaint shows:
1. That the defendant has property within this state or
debts owing to him from residents thereof;
2. That the defendant is a resident of this state and has
departed therefrom with intent to defraud his creditors,
or to avoid the service of a summons, or keeps himself
secreted therein with a like intent;
3. That the relief sought in the action consists wholly or
partly in excluding the defendant from any interest in or lien
upon specific real or personal property within this state, or
113. No statute is listed by the Joint Committee as superseded by this rule.
114. The phrase "or has failed to file its annual report as required by law" was added
by the list of amendments submitted to the North Dakota Supreme Court by the Joint

Committee on June 17, 1955.
115. The superseded statutory provision is N.D. Rev. Code §28-0620

.identical to this rule in every respect save that mentioned in note 114.

(1943),

which is
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in enforcing, regulating, defining, or limiting such interest
or lien in favor of either party to the action or otherwise
affects the title to such property;
4. That the action is for divorce or for a decree annulling a
marriage; or
5. That the defendant, although a resident of this state,
has been
continuously absent from the state for more than sixty
11
days. 6
The language of the foregoing provisions is derived almost entirely from provisions of the North Dakota Revised Code of 1943
now on the books. They thus represent virtually no change in the
law of North Dakota on the procedure to be followed in making
service by publication.
The cases involving service by publication usually involve attacks
upon the affidavit for publication required by the second subdivision above. It is clear that this affidavit must be made in strict
conformity to the statute, 1 7 and that similarly the various steps
specified by the statute must be taken precisely as the statute
requires; even minor variations are in many cases sufficient to
invalidate the service. Thus, it is a jurisdictional defect if actual
publication of the summons is commenced before the affidavit for
publication has been filed with the clerk of court. 118 The
same thing is true of the sheriff's return of service. 11 Likewise,
when the affidavit for publication states that the defendant's
"post office address" 12 or "whereabouts"' 21 is unknown, it is insufficient; the statute requires a statement that the place of the
defendant's residence is not known in cases where such is the fact
and is not concerned with post office addresses or approximate
locations. Where the affidavit sets forth the place of the defendant's
residence specifically, an allegation that he is a non-resident of the
22
state is of course redundant and unnecessary.
A puzzling case is Dallas v. Luster, 2' decided in 1914. In that
case the affidavit for publication of the summons was made by the
attorney and asserted the non-residence of the defendant merely
upon the belief of the attorney. "No attempt was therein made,
116. The superseded statutory provision is N.D. Rev. Code §28-0621 (1943), which is
identical to this rule in every respect.
117. See Roberts v. Enderlin Investment Co., 21 N.D. 594, 599-600, 132 N.W. 145,
147 (1911).

118. Jablonski v. Piesik, 30 N.D. 543, 153 N.W. 274 (1915).

119. Roberts v. Enderlin Investment Co., 21 N.D. 594, 132 N.W. 145 (1911).
120. Hughes v. Fargo Loan Agency, 46 N.D. 26, 178 N.W. 997 (1920); Jablonski v.
Piesik, 30 N.D. 543, 153 N.W. 274 (1915); Atwood v. Tucker, 26 N.D. 622, 145 N.W.
587 (1914).

121. Kruimenacker v. Andis, 38 N.D. 500,*165 N.W. 524 (1917).
122. Klein v. Loiland, 59 N.D. 18, 228 N.W. 420 (1929).
123. 27 N.D. 450, 147 N.W. 95 (1914).
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even upon information and belief, to show that the plaintiff himself
had no knowledge of the defendant's place of residence or address.
There was in it no proof or even any statement of any effort, either
on the part of the attorney or of his client, to ascertain her whereabouts." 1'2 The court thought that this brought it about that the
provisions of the statute had been "totally ignored," and invalidated
a judgment based on service supported by the affidavit. The inference would seem to be that the client should sign the affidavit for
publication,125 but the court has upheld affidavits for publication
signed by the attorney rather than the client'2 6 in the past and it
seems to be the customary practice for the attorney to sign them.
It will be noted that in the main service by publication is
permitted only in cases where the court is exercising jurisdiction in
rem. Thus, subdivisions 1, 3 and 4 of Rule 4 (g) (2).clearly contemplate only in rem jurisdiction in the case they cover.12 Subdivisions 2 and 5, however, allow service by publication in cases
where the defendant is a "resident" of the state. They should be
1 s
read in connection with Rule 4 (e) (1). 21
(3) Number of Publications.Service of the summons by publication may be made by publishing the same three weeks,
once in each week for three successive weeks, in a newspaper
published in the county in which the action is pending, if a
newspaper is published in such county, and if no newspaper is
published in such county then in a newspaper published in
an adjoining
county and having a general circulation in such
29
county.1
This particular subdivision of Rule 4 (g) is, once again, merely
a carry-over of statutory language into the new rules without
substantial change. As noted in the comment to the preceding
sections, if publication is commenced prior to the filing of the
affidavit for publication and the filing of the sheriffs return, the
30
service is invalid.
(4) Mailing Summons and Complaint. A copy of the summons and complaint, at any time after the filing of the
124. Id. at 453, 147 N.W. at 96.
125. The case uses this language: "The affidavit for publication of the summons was
altogether insufficient. It was made by the attorney for the plaintiff, and went merely to
the extent of the knowledge of that attorney." Id. at 453, 147 N.W. at 96.
126. Klein v. Loiland, 59 N.D. 18, 228 N.W. 420 (1929).
127. Causes of action for divorce or annulment normally are considered to be actions
quasi in rem.
128. See the discussion of domicil as a basis for jurisdiction following rule 4 6e).
129. The superseded statutory provision is N.D. Rev. Code §28-0622 (Supp. 1953).
This rule is merely a restatement of that provision.
130. Jablonski v. Fiesik, 30 N.D. 543, 153 N.W. 274 (1915).
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affidavit for publication and not later than ten days after the
first publication of the summons, shall be deposited in some
post office in this state, postage prepaid, and directed to the
defendant to be served at his place of residence unless the
affidavit for publication states that the residence of the defendant is unknown.ll1
(5) Personal Service Outside State Equivalent to Publication.
After the affidavit 'for publication and the complaint in the
action are filed, personal service of the summons and complaint
upon the defendant out of the state shall be equivalent to and
shall have the same force and effect
132 as the publication and
mailing provided for in this chapter.
(6) Time When First Publication or Service Outside State
Must Be Made. The first publication of the summons, or personal service of the summons and complaint upon the defendant out of the state, must be made within sixty days after
the filing of the affidavit for publication. If not so made,
the action shall be deemed discontinued." 3'
(7) When Service by Publicationor Outside State Complete.
Service by publication is complete upon the expiration of
fifteen days after the first publication of the summons, or in
case of personal service of the summons and complaint upon
the defendant out of the state, upon the expiration of fifteen
days after the date of such service."'
(8) When Defendant Served by Publication Permitted to
Defend. The defendant upon whom service by publication is
made, or his representative, on application and sufficient
cause shown at any time before judgment, shall be allowed
to defend the action. Except in any action for divorce, the
defendant upon whom service by publication is made, or
his representative, upon making it appear to the satisfaction of
the court by affidavit, stating the facts, that he has a good and
meritorious defense to the action, and that he had no notice or
knowledge of the pendency of the action so as to enable him
to make application to defend before the entry of judgment
therein, and upon filing an affidavit of merits, may be allowed
to defend at any time within three years after entry of judgment on such terms as may be just. If the defense is successful,
and if the judgment or any part thereof, has been collected or
otherwise enforced, such restitution thereupon may be compelled as the court directs, but the title to property sold under
6uch judgment to a purchaser in good faith shall not be affected thereby. Any defendant who shall have received a copy
of the summons in the action mailed to him as provided in
subdivision (g) (4) of this rule, or upon whom the summons
shall have been personally served out of the state, as provided
131. This supersedes but does not materially alter N.D. Rev. Code §28-0623 (1943).
T27 The superseded statutory provision is N.D. Rev. Code §28-0624 (1943).
133. N.D. Rev. Code §28-0625 (1943) is the superseded statutory provision.
134. N;D. Rev. Code §28-0626 (Supp. 1953) is the superseded statutory provision.
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in subdivision (g) (5) of this rule, shall be deemed to have
had notice of the pendency of the action and of the judgment
entered therein.15

(9) Additional Information to be Published. In all cases
where publication of summons is made in an action in which
the title to, or any interest in or lien upon real property is
involved or affected or brought into question, the publication
shall also contain a description of the real property involved,
affected or brought into question thereby, and a statement of
the object of the action."'
With the exception of subdivision (9), the foregoing provisions
of Rule 4 (g) are all in substance statutes preserved from the
code Without material change. It will be noted that Rule 4 (g)
(5) presents an alternative method of making service of process
outside the jurisdiction. The practitioner making use of this provision should be careful to proceed as prescribed by the statutes
regulating the service of summons by publication up to the point
where actual publication of the summons would confer jurisdiction.
A defect which would invalidate service of the summons by publication Would obviously invalidate service under Rule 4 (g) (5) .13
It is also to be noted that Rule 4 (g) (8) contains at least one
provision which would appear to be of substantive, rather than
procedural, import. This is the provision that when title to property
which has been the subject of an action commenced by constructive
service has passed into the hands of a bona fide purchaser, the
title is not affected by a vacation of the judgment occurring thereafter. The provision has been carried over from the Code and its
status would appear, at first glance, anomalous in the Rules. If
the Rules come into force, the statute will have been superseded
and thus, presumptively, of no further effect. But can a set of
rules devoted to procedural issues prescribe when and under what
conditions a purchaser of real property can acquire an indefeasible
title?"1
Rule 4 (g) (9) is new material of obvious worth. It is intended
to make the publication of a summons meaningful and it may, iii
certain circumstances, enable a judgment founded on such publica-

135. This restates N.D. Rev. Code f28-0627 (1943).
136. This provision is new. See text discussion, infra.
137. As illustrated by the case of Johnson v. Engelhard, 45 N.D. 11, 176 N.W. 134
(1920).
138. The answer would seem to be that while the statute involved has been superseded
from a procedural standpoint, it retains anysubstantive effect it might have possessed;
hence the particular provision involved would appear to remain good law,
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tion to withstand an attack based on the due process clause where
unknown claimants to real property are involved." 9
(h) Amendment. At any time, in its discretion, and upon
such notice and terms as it deems just, the court may allow any
process or proof of service thereof to be amended unless it
clearly appears that material prejudice would result to the
substantial rights of the party against whom the process
issued.'
A discussion of the operation of this rule has already appeared
in the comment to Rule 4 (a), and need not be repeated here.
(i) Proof of Service. Proof of the service of the summons
and of the complaint or notice, if any, accompanying the same
must be as follows:
(1) If served by the sheriff or other officer, his certificate
thereof;
(2) If by any other person, his affidavit therebf;
(3) In case of publication an affidavit made as provided
in section 31-0406 and an affidavit of the deposit of a copy
of the summons and complaint in the post office as required
by law, if the same shall have been deposited; or
(4) The written admission of the defendant showing the
time and place of service.
The certificate or affidavit of service mentioned in subsections 1 and 2 must state the time, date, place, and manner of
service."'
Rule 4 (i) is of obvious importance. It prescribes the method
of establishing for the record the jurisdictional foundation of a
plaintiff's case, and several decisions have been handed down by
the North Dakota Court concerning its subject matter.
The general rule of the common law was that the sheriff's return
of service was conclusive and could not be impeached. In this
state, however, the common law rule has been abolished. The Code
contains a provision to the effect that the sheriff's return of service
is prima facie evidence,142 which negatives the idea the return can
be considered conclusive. And the Court itself has disapproved, by
way of dictum, the "strict rule" of the common law regarding
non-impeachability of the return. 43 In cases involving an affidavit
of service by private individuals, the same result follows quite
139. Cf. Fenton v. Insurance Co., 15 N.D. 365, 109 N.W. 363 (1906).
140. The superseded statutory provision is N.D. Rev. Code §28-0632 (1943). Fed. R.
Civ. P. 4 (h) is identical.
141. The superseded statutory provision is N.D. Rev. Code §28-0628 (1943). The comparable provision in the Federal Rules is Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (g).
142. N.D. Rev. Code §11-1516 (1943).
143. See Odland v. O'Keeff Implement Co., 59 N.D. 335, 339, 229 N.W. 923, 924
(1930).
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logically, The affidavit may be impeached as to its factual content, 4 or as to its legal sufficiency, 45 and this has often been done.
(j) Contents of Affidavit of Service. Whenever a process,
pleading, order of court, or other paper is served personally
by a person other than the sheriff or person designated by law,
the affidavit of service, when made, shall state that the
person so serving is of legal age and the date and place of
making the service. It shall also state that the person making
such service knew the person served to be the person named in
the papers served and the person intended to be served.4'
The case law against which this rule must be considered is set
forth in the comment to the preceding section. It makes no change
in the law of North Dakota.
(To Be Continued)

144. Baird v. Ellison, 70 N.D. 261, 293 N.W. 794 (1940); Odland v. O'Keeffe Implement Co., 59 N.D. 335, 229 N.W. 923 (1930); Beery v. Peterson, 58 N.D. 273, 225
-N.W. 798 (1929).
145. Marin v. Potter, 15 N.D. 284, 107 N.W. 970 (1906).
146. The superseded statutory provision is N.D. Rev. Code §28-0629 (1943).
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